Crossing the floor/boundary, waka-jumping, political frog leaping, and defecting are all terms and phrases used worldwide to convey the action of party-hopping synonymously. It denotes the process by which a Member of Parliament (MP) turns their back on the political party of their initial allegiance to join an alternative party. Inevitably, this action causes a ripple effect that impacts not only the manner of governance and national direction but also expands outwardly, directly affecting careers, livelihoods, and large-scale projects as a by-product. The relationship between party-hopping and foreign investment is thereby unsurprising. Unlike short-term loans and portfolio investments, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) cannot be quickly withdrawn, which means that political and economic instability are considered inauspicious to the likes of foreign firms and investors. Anti-hopping laws (AHL) are therefore regarded as a  remedy to this overarching issue. Recently, this topic has stirred up exceptional mass media coverage and public attention due to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob's declaration on September 10th that the Cabinet has agreed to introduce a bill targeted at party-hopping to be drafted by the Attorney General. As such, this essay will assess the effectiveness of the proposed anti-hopping laws in line with general expectations.  

One of the most significant AHL proposals currently under consideration is being spearheaded by a former Dewan Rakyat speaker, Datuk Seri Azalina Othmad Said, who has submitted a Private Member's Bill comprising the recall election mechanism. According to the  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a recall election is a  process whereby voters have the right to revoke an elected legislator's position through direct votes before the end of their tenure. In a similar vein, Azalina's proposal is such that the voting will be done through a petition amongst the rakyat to determine the fate of a fellow MP who has come under scrutiny. If this petition were to receive more than 40% support in votes, the replacement of the MP would then be set in stone through the activation of a recall election. Thus, it can be said that a recall election would be feasible in the grand scheme of things. Especially if its mechanism were to be triggered, the targeted MP would have more than enough time and opportunity to explain to the rakyat the rationality behind their actions and have them considered.  

An alternative Bill is also being drafted by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) that would possess the same mechanism, albeit targeted at MPs who have committed misdeeds in the course of their defection. Differences between this bill and Azalina's are the voters' ability to commence a "recall petition" themselves on the grounds of party-hopping, given that the petition has at least 10% electorate support. The recall-by election would then be triggered, and the MP would be vacated from their seat if the petition received at least 25% eligible votes. According to the party spokesperson Chan Quin Er, their central dogma revolves around returning power to the people. In a way, the proposed AHLs are similar to the statutory provisions of our neighboring jurisdictions in that party defections would result in the revocation of their parliamentary seat. Notably, Article 46(2)(b) of the Republic Constitution of Singapore and section 55A of New Zealand's Electoral Act 1993 share a nearly identical clause mutually stipulating that if an MP were to leave their initial party, then their Parliament seat shall become vacant. These AHLs do not actively prevent party-hopping but rather state the consequences. Since the laws of these jurisdictions are similar to the proposals drafted, they are on the right track towards a successful implementation of AHLs in Malaysia.  

However, notable criticisms of these proposals can be seen from the former prime minister, Tun  Dr. Mahathir Mohamad's observation that the motives for why an MP has defected in the first place are significant when drafting the bill. The reasons being that a person may have been sacked from their initial party, they may have had a change of heart, a political party may have assimilated with another for collaborative purposes, and so on. Since the rationality behind these actions is justifiable and reasonable, he states that this is precisely why we may not simply forbid the jump but must instead concisely define which act constitutes an act of party-hopping in the first place. This observation indeed holds since Azalina's bill merely lays out instances where an MP may be voted off by petition but does not truly define the parameters of party-hopping. Overall, it would be unwise to categorize party-switchers with a  justifiable reason and party-hoppers with ulterior motives as the same and for both to receive identical punishments. Therefore, there should be a clear and concise definition that prevents injustice to those under the first category. 

Further analysis raised by the Centre for Governance and Political Studies (Cent-GPS) highlights that a law against party-hopping would have an adverse effect of a "slippery slope" for democracy in Malaysia due to the potential legislation's conflict with one's freedom of association. In the Malaysian Federal Constitution, this concern is about Article 10, notably 10(1)(c), which states that all citizens have a right to form associations. Not only that, the section is supported by the 1992 Supreme Court (SC) decision on the case of Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan v Nordin bin Salleh. Here it was held that anti-hopping law at the state level runs contrary to the concept of freedom of association, as enshrined in the Malaysian Federal Constitution. It becomes apparent that the interplay between the SC judgement and the article forms a barrier of precedence that halts AHL proceedings. As the retired Federal Court judge Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram points out, the proposals will not succeed unless the landmark pronouncement and the article are overturned and amended accordingly. He further states as a detriment that the "amendment to the constitution will fail because freedoms under Part 2 of the national charter form part of the basic framework". Although the presented facts paint the future of AHLs in a harsh light, there is still a glimmer of salvation in that the proposals for AHLs are in line with the decree by Yang di-Pertuan Agong Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri'ayatuddin Al-Mustafa Billah Shah along with the Malay Rulers. All of which share the consensus that a stable administration is necessary for consistent function, even amidst a crisis.  

Conclusively, there are undeniably tall hurdles to overcome for the implementation of AHLs to come into fruition, whether in the form of statutes, judicial precedences, constitutional concerns, and even definitional challenges. However, if constitutional amendments and the powers of the royal prerogative manage to circumvent these obstacles, then there may yet be a future for AHLs in Malaysia. Should they be successfully implemented, it would assuredly at the very least create some modicum of political and economic stability due to the new laws discouraging and deterring party-hopping. Therefore, its effectiveness is guaranteed if the requisite conditions are fulfilled and bypassed.